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Abstract 
 
This paper revisits the sudden stop in capital flows episode experienced by 
Chile in 1998. It documents the macroeconomic environment, the macro 
framework in place, and the shocks that hit it. The paper further examines the 
policy reaction to the shocks, evaluating its most likely consequences and 
analyzing key policy constraints faced at the time. Finally, the paper describes 
how the economy adjusted and compares the Chilean episode with several other 
recent sudden stop cases.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Like many other countries, Chile has suffered episodes of turnaround of large net capital inflows 
with important macroeconomic consequences, a situation known as a sudden stop in the 
international finance literature. Being particularly vulnerable because of the initial conditions and 
the policy framework in place, Chile suffered a sudden stop in 1982, which, combined with other 
shocks, had extremely severe macroeconomic consequences for the economy. In 1998, during the 
retrenchment of capital flows from emerging markets following the Asian crisis, and also 
accompanied by other shocks, Chile suffered a sudden stop once again. Net capital inflows were 
equivalent to 7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (US$ 5.8 billion) in the year ending in 
1998Q1 and dropped to less than 1 percent of GDP (US$ 0.7 billion) in the year ending in 
1999Q1. Net inflows were particularly high in 1997Q3-1998Q1, whereas outflows were 
especially large in the first half of 1999, with a total of US$ 1.5 billion. At the same time, Chile 
suffered a decline in its terms of trade due to a drop in export prices.  
The adjustment of the Chilean economy in this environment was intense, ending in a 
small recession in 1999. However, in comparison with other sudden stop episodes, in which there 
was a meltdown of the financial sector and a deep recession, this case may be considered a 
successful one. With this presumption in mind, this chapter revisits the 1998 Chilean episode 
underpinning the policy responses decided at the time. The objective is twofold: first, to 
document the macroeconomic environment faced by policymakers and the policy reactions, 
evaluating its most likely consequences and analyzing key policy constraints in place at that time 
and the type of adjustment the economy had to make; and second, to compare the Chilean 
episode with a few other recent sudden stop cases along particular dimensions.  
The chapter shows that the Chilean 1998-99 adjustment was primarily based on 
restraining domestic demand through restrictive macroeconomic policy, particularly on the 
monetary side. An overheated economy, with a large current account deficit at the time of the 
external shock, made control of growth in domestic demand the top policy priority. The greater 
sensitivity to interest rates of import-intensive domestic demand components made possible a 
large turnaround in the current account. The adjustment did not include a relevant role for 
switching effects.    
A strong financial system and healthy public finances helped avoid multiplier effects from 
shocks. In comparison with other episodes, the Chilean case appears to have endured a rather   4
small decline in international reserves, higher interest rates, and a less significant adjustment in 
the real exchange rate. Furthermore, the Chilean case is particular because it involved strong 
capital outflows rather than a violent discontinuance of inflows. Policy alternatives were severely 
constrained by the macroeconomic policy framework in place. Moreover, the perception of a 
high pass-through from depreciation to inflation (especially in an overheated economy) and the 
concern over potential balance sheet effects at the corporate level strongly influenced the policy 
mix. The perception of persistent external imbalances and imperfect credibility led to a 
continuation of contractionary policies and further rigidities in the policy framework. The 
episode also shows that sudden and excessively large interest rate hikes may have non-linear 
effects, that buying credibility in the short run through the announcement of extremely restrictive 
policy rules entails important risks if fundamentals continue deteriorating, and that improving 
credibility through fiscal policy announcements is no easy task.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the macroeconomic policy 
framework and initial conditions in place before the episode. Section 3 examines the external 
shocks the economy confronted in 1997-98 and the type of macroeconomic adjustment the 
economy followed during 1998-99. Section 4 reviews the policy responses implemented during 
this episode, evaluating its effects and some of the constraints faced at the time. Section 5 
describes a second phase of policy reactions, implemented after the shock was absorbed, that 
meant an important overhaul of the macroeconomic policy framework. Section 6 analyzes the 
Chilean case in perspective, comparing it in some particular dimensions with other well-known 
episodes. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Macroeconomic Policy Framework and Initial Conditions 
 
2.1. Macroeconomic Policy Framework
1 
 
The macroeconomic policy framework in place in Chile around 1997 had a number of features. 
First, with goal and instrument independence granted in 1989, and with a clear objective to 
maintain price stability and the normal functioning of payments, the Central Bank of Chile was in 
the process of pursuing the level of inflation in developed countries through the announcement 
and fulfillment of annual inflation targets. These annual quantitative inflation targets were the 
                                                 
1 This section draws on Céspedes et al. (2006).   5
predominant nominal anchor of the economy. In a way, the framework had some of the 
characteristics of an inflation-targeting regime in transition to a steady state.  
Annual targets were announced each September for the December-to-December inflation 
rate for the next year, in the Central Bank’s annual report to Congress established by law. The 
announcements included slow convergence to lower inflation explicitly because of the prevalence 
of widespread backward-looking indexation in the Chilean economy. Rapid convergence to a 
low-inflation regime was considered risky because it could generate key relative price 
misalignments that, in turn, were likely to produce negative real effects and jeopardize the 
disinflation program’s sustainability. Only once in the 11-year period was this annual 
announcement overridden during the next year. The episode occurred in 1995, when the target 
was modified from 9 to 8 percent. The Central Bank was remarkably successful in bringing 
inflation down from 30 percent to less than 5 percent per year.  
The Central Bank had another nominal commitment through an exchange rate band 
system. The objective of the exchange rate policy was to maintain the current account deficit 
within sustainable levels, a target that was explicit within the framework. When it entered in 
contradiction with the inflation target, the latter prevailed. In principle, these contradictions were 
avoided through the management of capital account regulations (see Massad, 2001, for further 
details).  
The exchange rate band was based on a purchasing power parity (PPP) rule, corrected 
during some periods for productivity differentials between Chile and its trading partners. It 
underwent a number of modifications in the 1990s, including changes in its width and once-and-
for-all realignments. The Central Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market not only at the 
edges of the band, but also actively within it. 
Among the regulations of the capital account, the Central Bank imposed a non-
remunerated reserve requirement for capital inflows of 30 percent for one year—which was 
increasingly broadened to different forms of inflows until 1997—and a minimum stay period for 
some types of inflows.  
Throughout the 1990s, the way the Central Bank conducted monetary policy was 
progressively improved. From a rather rough management of interest rates on instruments of 
different tenors in 1990, the Bank converged to managing liquidity in order to achieve a 
particular overnight interest rate in the interbank market (the target being the monetary policy   6
interest rate). In addition to new debt issuances and debt falling due, and constant reserve 
requirements on sight and term deposits (which had to be fulfilled on a monthly average), 
liquidity excesses or shortages were regulated through a credit facility (a liquidity credit line) and 
a deposit facility. The credit facility offered a maximum volume (in turn, a function of last 
month’s reserve requirement) and no collateral, and worked with interest rates that were 
differentiated in trenches (see Massad, 1998, for further details).  
Foreign exchange interventions, in turn, were done in different ways, including direct 
purchases from public enterprises (mainly Codelco) and through market operations. From the 
publicly available information, it was not straightforward to determine the exact extent and 
timing of the interventions. The information combined data on interventions and other 
international reserve movements—although interventions clearly tried to hinder the strong real 
exchange rate appreciation trend. The effort to sterilize inflows between 1990 and 1997 was a 
large one. During that period, the Central Bank of Chile increased its foreign exchange reserve 
holdings from US$ 2.5 billion to US$ 17.8 billion. This implied that the foreign exchange 
position implicit in the Central Bank’s balance sheet switched from 5.1 percent of GDP short to 
around 25 percent of GDP long.  
During the 1990s, fiscal policy was well managed, allowing the central government’s net 
public debt to decline from 37.6 percent of GDP in 1989 to 5 percent in 1997. Strong growth 
performance facilitated this result, although institutional factors also contributed. In fact, despite 
not having an explicit fiscal rule, Chile had (and continues to have) strong fiscal institutions. 
They range from a centralized state (not a federal state), to a strong Ministry of Finance within 
the government, to arrangements such as a copper price stabilization fund that allows the 
authority to set aside abnormally high copper revenues in a transparent way. 
In addition to strong monetary and fiscal policies, the Chilean economy also displays 
strong financial institutions. Drawing on the experience of the debt crisis in the 1980s, which led 
to the collapse of the banking system, there was a substantial improvement in financial regulation 
and supervision. These changes have allowed the development of a healthy and resilient financial 
system. Toward 1997, the regulation was upgraded with a new banking law that included the 
application of Basel I principles, allowed for cross-border activities, and widened the range of 
businesses with which banks were allowed to engage (e.g., factoring, leasing, securitization, 
selling personal insurance, underwriting of stock offerings). Furthermore, non-banking   7
intermediaries were increasingly gaining importance. In 1997, pension funds managed close to 
US$ 30 billion (36 percent of GDP), while there were domestic currency (Unidad de Fomento, 
UF) corporate bonds outstanding for an amount equivalent to US$ 2.5 billion (3 percent of GDP).  
 
2.2. Initial Macroeconomic Conditions 
 
Against the backdrop of the macroeconomic framework described above, the Chilean economy 
showed quite sustained and solid expansion in the years before the Asian crisis. Indeed, between 
1990 and 1997 GDP growth averaged 7.7 percent per year. Both exports and investment 
contributed decidedly to this unprecedented performance. To a large extent, a smooth transition 
to democracy and a strict commitment to macroeconomic stability improved asset prices and 
supported favorable economic dynamics. Furthermore, the rising trade integration of the 
economy together with a depreciated real exchange rate fostered export growth. On the inflation 
front, the gradual disinflation program started in 1990 progressed very well with single digits 
already in 1994 and annual targets met year after year (and even adjusted downward in 1995).  
However, by 1996-97, the economy was showing a few signs that such rapid growth 
performance could become unsustainable. The current account deficit was more than 4 percent of 
GDP, at the limit of what was judged prudent by the authorities. Domestic savings were 
considered insufficient and the real exchange rate showed a marked appreciation trend, with signs 
of misalignment (Table 1). In 1997, net capital inflows excluding international reserves averaged 
more than 8 percent of GDP, despite capital controls.
2 This situation led to heavy foreign 
exchange market interventions by the Central Bank. In 1997 it accumulated more than US$ 3.4 
billion in international reserves, equivalent to 4.1 percent of GDP and 20 percent of the stock of 
reserves that existed at the beginning of the year. This happened despite the fact that the 
exchange rate target band parameters were adjusted in early 1997, implying a decline in the band 
floor (a peso appreciation) of 6.5 percent. Overall, between 1996 and 1997, the real exchange rate 
appreciated almost 15 percent.
3  
Other signs of overheating included the fact that the CPIX1 core inflation measure 
increased in 1996, despite the real exchange rate appreciation; the boom of the construction 
                                                 
2 The effects of these controls have been studied extensively; see Gallego et al. (1999), De Gregorio et al. (2000), 
and Le Fort and Lehman (2000) for more details and different views.    
3 In addition to comparisons with historical real exchange rate levels, real-time fundamental exchange rate equations 
showed signs of misalignment.    8
sector, which expanded briskly toward the end of 1997; and average real credit growth above 14 
percent per year in both 1996 and 1997.
4  
Private sector behavior was a key driver of this exuberant spending pattern, in part as a 
rational reaction to the notion that trend growth could be as high as 7 percent.
5 Besides the 
observed high average growth, the strong resilience of the economy to the Mexican crisis at the 
end of 1994 (partly thanks to the favorable terms of trade shock in 1995) reassured the public that 
steady growth could continue for a long time. As a sign of preoccupation over this pattern, the 
government appointed in 1996 a special commission, with representatives of different sectors, to 
make recommendations on how to foster domestic savings. 
During 1997, reflecting the authority’s concern with the aggregate spending trend, the 
Superintendency of Banks induced banks to be especially vigilant with real estate credit and put 
in place a system of additional provisions for consumer credit.  
Although at the time there were heated discussions regarding the role of fiscal policy in 
the excessive spending, alternative estimates of the fiscal impulse show that this was indeed 
positive, but small, particularly in 1997 (see Table 5).
6 The central government had a surplus of 2 
percent of GDP in 1997 (1.1 percent if measured structurally). Of course, a more conservative 
fiscal policy would have moderate aggregate demand, but it is difficult to pinpoint the fiscal 
behavior behind the current account deficit. Marfán (2003), in a discussion of the difficulties for 
macroeconomic policy of private sector imbalances, reports that the excess investment over 
savings of the economy excluding the central government was between 6 and 7 percent of GDP 
in 1996-97.  
Monetary policy during 1997 moved from a mildly contractionary stance to a more 
neutral one. The overnight real interest rate (indexed by the consumer price index, CPI) was cut 
by 100 basis points through 1997 to 6.5 percent annual, with the last cut in September. This 
policy was very much influenced by developments on the inflation front and the fact that 
domestic demand surged only at year’s end. It also reflected the view that part of capital inflows 
were due to interest rate differentials.  
                                                 
4 Maybe reflecting the perception of unsustainability of domestic demand growth, the stock market decreased in 
1996 and increased very little in 1997.  
5 It is worth mentioning that political campaigns began to include 7 percent as the GDP growth benchmark for Chile 
in 1996. At the beginning of the 1990s, the number was 5 to 5.5 percent.  Chile was supposed to become a “tiger,” 
like the Asian countries.  
6 Budnevich and Le Fort’s (1997) paper is a good example of the concern with fiscal policy that existed at the time. 
In a nutshell, they propose greater countercyclical efforts to offset private swings.     9
The 1998 budget was designed before the first signs of the Asian crisis became clear. It 
considered a small fiscal impulse and a surplus close to 1 percent of GDP, and a GDP growth rate 
of 7 percent, a very different growth scenario than what actually happened. Expenditures with a 
clear effect on aggregate demand were supposed to increase by more than 7 percent in real terms. 
With the budget already approved, and with more clear signs of the risks posed by the 
international situation, the government gave an important signal when it increased public sector 
wages by only 6 percent nominal in its annual adjustment in November. This adjustment was 
smaller than in other years and strongly opposed by public sector unions. Politically, the signal 
was costly: the results of Congressional elections that year were not welcome by the ruling 
coalition and in part the result was blamed on the wage adjustment. In the coalition, there was 
increasing discussion between two groups: those that relatively favored macro discipline and 
defended what had been achieved, and those that preferred a bolder approach with more 
emphasis on social policies.  
In December 1997, total external debt was US$ 29 billion, representing 35 percent of 
GDP and 1.7 percent of total exports. Less than 8 percent was government debt and close to 9 
percent was commercial bank debt. Less than 20 percent was short term. These numbers point in 
general to limited vulnerability of the economy on this front. In part, they reflect the effect of 
capital account regulations: longer maturities and inflows that take other forms, such as FDI. 
Perhaps the most difficult situation on the external debt side was its relative concentration in 
large corporations, particularly public utilities.  
 
3. The 1997-98 Shocks and the Macroeconomic Adjustment 
 
The Chilean economy faced two related external shocks in 1997-98, namely a drop in the terms 
of trade, led by a substantial decline in the price of copper (a commodity that represented 
approximately 42 percent of total exports in 1997) and a large fall in net capital inflows. Both 
shocks were related to the Asian crisis, which started in Thailand in July 1997, with the 
devaluation of the baht, and spread to other countries, including the Russian Federation default in 
July 1998. However, as will be clarified below, the capital flows component was largely 
determined by domestic agents’ portfolio decisions, a point raised by Cowan et al. (2006). The 
adjustment of the economy involved a considerable adjustment in the current account deficit, 
which moved from 6.5 percent of GDP in 1998Q3 (on a cumulative 12-month basis) to a surplus   10
of 0.1 percent in 1999Q4. This adjustment was achieved primarily through a large reduction in 
domestic demand led by a contractionary macroeconomic stance, particularly driven by monetary 
policy.  
These shocks were first felt in the exchange rate market at the end of October 1997, when 
a small depreciation trend began. In January 1998, the depreciation trend increased suddenly, 
accumulating a 6 percent weakening of the peso in only five days, a large adjustment given the 
volatility of the exchange rate in the previous quarters. This episode became the first of three 
speculative attacks against the peso that Chilean authorities had to confront during 1998. Later, at 
the end of June, a second episode become apparent, and again in September. The stock market’s 
reaction to the shocks included a large drop in January (within a general trend of stock price 
reassessment in the world) and large losses during August and the first half of September.  
 
3.1. Terms of Trade 
 
Although the terms of trade only declined 2.5 percent between 1998 and 1997, the unit prices of 
both exports and imports declined substantially, the former being more noticeable in real time 
(more on this below). The action started in 1997Q4 and was particularly intense in 1998Q1, with 
a year-over-year drop in the unit price of exports of 5.9 and 16 percent, respectively, for those 
dates. Between 1997Q3 and 1999Q1, the average price of copper declined 38 percent, from US$ 
1.03 to US$ 63.7 per pound. In the same period, wood pulp prices declined 21 percent. The 16 
percent decline in export prices was approximately equivalent to a US$ 2.8 billion shock in the 
trade balance (on a yearly basis). 
This drop in export prices was clearly related to deceleration in trading partners’ growth, 
which declined more than 1 percentage point to 2.4 percent in 1998. Asian countries were the 
most important ones, representing 33 percent of total Chilean exports in 1997, being important 
consumers of copper and other raw materials. In 1998 this share decreased to 26 percent.  
The declining prices of imports substantially cushioned the effect of the export price 
shock on the overall economy. Indeed, unit import prices declined 10.5 percent year over year in 
1998Q1, reflecting lower prices of broad categories. Measurement difficulties implied that only 
after some time was it clear that this was happening. Earlier estimates showed an import price 
decline only half as large. Thus, real-time estimates of the 1998 drop in the terms of trade were   11
much larger than current calculations. The Central Bank presented estimates of −12.1 percent in 
1999, while ECLAC estimates were in the range of 12-13 percent. 
Given that approximately 50 percent of copper extraction was privately owned, the 
importance of the decline in the copper price for the external account was partially offset by 
lower profit remittances. At the same time, however, because the rest was almost entirely 
government owned, the drop in copper prices had important implications for the fiscal accounts. 
The abnormally low copper price in 1998 meant 1 percent of GDP in lower revenues to the 
government, close to 5 percent of total revenues.  
 
3.2. Capital Flows 
 
The capital account or finance shock, at least in terms of quantity, can be analyzed by tracing the 
behavior of the investment position data that account for both transactions and valuation effects. 
Figures 1 to 5 show different splits of changes in the investment position measured in 12-month 
cumulative US dollars. Considering both valuation and transactions simultaneously, the change 
in the net investment position moved from US$ 7.3 billion (“inflows”) in 1997Q3 to US$ −1.5 
billion in 1998Q4 (“outflows”), which is a turnaround of almost US$ 9 billion.
7 Of course, the 
fraction of the dynamics of the net position that is due to valuation effects does not have a 
counterpart in the current account, nor is it an important driver of the macroeconomic adjustment. 
Still, it reflects changes in the value of net assets. Both assets (that is, assets of Chilean residents 
abroad) and liabilities (assets of foreigners in Chile) adjusted, but the timing, nature, and 
magnitudes of their movements differed. Indeed, the change in liabilities occurred primarily in 
the first half of 1998, and was mostly due to changes in valuations. Negative valuation changes 
(“inflows”) of almost US$ 12 billion in 1997Q3 turned into positive valuation changes 
(“outflows”) of almost US$ 500 million in 1998Q3. Total valuation effects associated with 
assets, on the contrary, stayed relatively stable up to 1998Q3, when they increased massively to 
become “outflows” of almost US$ 12 billion in 1999Q2, basically due to transactions (rather than 
valuation changes).   
Valuation effects represented an increase of net liabilities (an “inflow”) of US$ 3.2 billion 
in the year ending in 1997Q3 and a decline in net liabilities (an “outflow”) of US$ 6.2 billion in 
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1998Q3. These numbers were basically concentrated in adjustments in the value of liabilities and 
largely reflected the adjustment in copper prices—and therefore in the value of FDI in Chile—
and the drop in the domestic stock market.  
More interestingly from a macroeconomic adjustment perspective, total transaction 
inflows remained positive and large up to 1998Q4, with 12-month cumulative inflows totaling 
US$ 4.1 billion. Large net outflows occurred in 1999H1 only, with a total of US$ 1.5 billion.  
The dynamics of assets and liabilities transactions were very different in this period nonetheless. 
Transaction flows associated with liabilities decreased from US$ 10 billion to US$ 8 billion 
during 1998 and increased to US$ 12.8 billion in 1999Q3. That is, foreigners were mildly pro-
cyclical during 1998 and strongly countercyclical in 1999, providing finance to the country. It 
should be mentioned that no special or back-up program with multinationals was put in place, nor 
were specific credit lines contracted or triggered. Transaction flows associated with assets, on the 
contrary, were highly pro-cyclical, showing increasing outflows during this period: 12-month 
cumulative US$ 3.5 billion in 1998Q3 and US$ 11.3 billion in 1999Q2. Excluding international 
reserves, the turnaround of flows associated with assets was even more dramatic: from basically 
0 in 1997Q4 to US$ −5.8 billion in 1998Q2 and US$ −12 billion in 1999Q2.  
The large outflows of the domestic private sector accumulated to 1999Q2 included 
portfolio equity, portfolio debt, deposits, and foreign direct investment (FDI), with portfolio 
equity being slightly more important (Figure 6). In terms of the institutional origin of flows, 
banks explain a small portion (12 percent), FDI (corporate FDI abroad) explains 24 percent, 
whereas the rest is “other private sector,” which includes institutional investors. Pension fund 
(AFP) foreign investment explains a large fraction of these changes. It increased the share of the 
funds invested abroad from 1.5 percent (US$ 0.4 billion) in December 1997 to 5.7 percent (US$ 
1.8 billion) in December 1998 and 13.4 percent (US$ 4.6 billion) in December 1999. During the 
period of overall net outflows in 1999H1, the pension system increased foreign holdings by US$ 
2.4 billion, almost US$ 1 billion more than the net result.    
Some of the changes in the pension fund investment were due to changes in regulation. In 
September 1998, the maximum limits for foreign investment were increased by law from 12 to 20 
percent, with a transition period managed by the Central Bank. In this transition, it raised to 16 
percent the overall limit in January 1999, and in two trenches, from 6 to 8 percent in January and 
to 10 percent in April, the limit on variable income foreign investment (Figure 5A). The central   13
rationale given with the announcements was that the risk-return frontier that the pension system 
could attain had improved. The April communiqué also included an evaluation stating that capital 
inflows could increase shortly and the economy needed room to absorb these flows.  
At the moment the Asian crisis started, in part reflecting the sustained fiscal surpluses in 
the previous years, Chile did not have any international sovereign bonds outstanding. In fact, 
only in April 1999 did the government tap the markets with its first international issuance in 
decades—a global bond of US$ 1,000—allowing it to finance that year’s deficit. Therefore, there 
are no direct measures of the price effect of the shock in 1997-98. However, there were some 
private corporate bonds outstanding that showed a substantial increase in the country risk 
premium. This spread hovered around 110 basis points in 1997Q3 and increased to 170 basis 
points in the first half of 1998, and to 363 basis points in 1998Q4. As a reference, the Latin 
American EMBI increased from 460 to 962 basis points between 1997Q4 and 1998Q4.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that the stock market declined by 10 percent in 1997Q4. 
Compared with the end of 1997Q3, the maximum correction was 52 percent in mid-September 




The flip side of the changes in external financing discussed above was a large adjustment in the 
current account deficit, more than 6 percent of GDP in one year. As is clear from Tables 1 and 2, 
this was achieved mainly through a compression of domestic absorption, which led to a mild 
recession in 1999. GDP growth declined from 7 percent in 1996-97 to 3.2 percent in 1998 and 
−0.8 percent in 1999.
8 The adjustment in domestic demand was larger, from an expansion of 7.5 
percent in 1996-97, to 3.7 percent in 1998, to a decline of almost 6 percent in 1999, led by a drop 
of 18 percent in fixed capital formation.  
Alternative approaches to analyzing how much of the adjustment was due to switching 
and how much due to domestic demand compression portray a similar picture, namely that a 
change in composition of demand and output due to a change in relative prices did not play a 
relevant role. First, the real exchange rate depreciation—in principle, the key driver of 
switching—barely moved during 1998 and 1999Q2. A real exchange rate depreciation of close to 
                                                 
8 The decline in GDP was exacerbated by a severe drought in 1999, with an incidence of up to 1 percent according 
to Central Bank of Chile (1999).    14
10 percent occurred only during the second half of 1999, after GDP bottomed out in 1999Q2. 
This may have played a role in the dynamics the economy followed in 2000, but cannot be 
regarded as part of the adjustment in early 1999.  
Second, the incidence or contribution of exports to GDP growth remained around 1.5-2.0 
percent in 1998-99, below its contribution in 1997 (Figure 7). Moreover, a substantial part of this 
dynamism, which could still be regarded as surprising given the poor external conditions, can be 
explained by new mining projects that matured and began operations at the time.  
Of course, the fact that exports did not increase their contribution to GDP growth is not 
proof that there was no switching; there could have been an expansion of import-substituting 
sectors. However, for this to happen, one would see a larger share of tradables in GDP.
9 The fact 
is, however, that the incidence of real exchange rate sensitive tradable goods production in GDP 
(measured as the share in total value added) did not increase during this period (Figure 8). In 
particular, the share of manufacturing stayed virtually constant at 17.5 percent in 1997-99. 
Tradable sectors that are—in principle—insensitive to changes in relative prices, primarily 
mining, did expand their participation, but this was because of the aforesaid expansion projects.  
Rather than switching, the main mechanism behind the closing of the current account 
deficit was a change in domestic demand composition. This adjustment in composition was due 
to the diverse sensitivity that different components have to the interest rate and possibly other 
cyclical conditions, such as the external environment. At the same time, the same components of 
domestic demand that adjusted the most have a large imported component, thereby affecting the 
current account (or domestic demand, but not GDP to the same extent). More specifically, during 
the first three quarters of 1999, domestic demand declined by 8.7 percent year over year, 
although GDP fell by “only” 3 percent. However, despite accounting for no more than 10 percent 
of domestic demand, investment in machinery and equipment shrank by 30.6 percent, 
contributing to (having an incidence in) domestic demand growth of −3.4 percent. A similar 
situation happened with durable consumption. Although it represented only about 5 percent of 
domestic demand, after falling 31.1 percent it contributed −1.7 percent to the domestic demand 
adjustment (Figure 9). Both of these components of domestic demand are almost entirely 
imported.  
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One particularly important transmission channel behind the domestic adjustment and 
stressed in the sudden stops literature is the credit squeeze that follows the abrupt reduction of 
capital inflows (see, e.g., Calvo et al., 2006). As shown before, however, the Chilean 1998 case is 
not a usual sudden stop episode, considering the fact that gross inflows did not come to a halt and 
gross outflows increased. What happened with credit is also somehow different from other 
sudden stop episodes. Although money growth did decline during 1998, prior to the recession, 
credit continued to expand during that year, albeit at a lower pace (Figure 10). Credit ceased to 
grow only when GDP did, in line with the idea that it is a coincident indicator. Finally, in the 
recovery of 2000-01, credit expanded at a very slow pace, this time in line with other sudden stop 
episodes, where the “phoenix miracle” has been observed.   
 
4. Policy Responses Mark I: Managing the Crisis 
 
4.1. Real-Time Diagnosis and Policy Objectives 
 
To a large extent, the immediate policy responses to the crisis were shaped by three ingredients. 
First, the economy was running a large current account deficit due to overly vigorous domestic 
demand, making the objective of cooling down the economy the top policy priority when the 
Asian crisis effects were more visible. Financing this large current account deficit was probably 
not a difficult task in normal times, but with turmoil in international markets and tighter external 
financial conditions, the economy needed a large adjustment. At the same time, a large drop in 
terms of trade both deepened the external deficit, at least  in the short run, and deteriorated the 
fiscal accounts, given the importance of copper revenues in total fiscal revenues. Therefore, the 
question early on was whether the adjustment was policy driven or rather forced by a disorderly 
market reaction (in the form of a sudden stop, although the concept did not exist at the time).  
Second, the policy framework in place had important embedded rigidities, while 
policymakers faced actual or perceived restrictions that markedly narrowed the policy 
alternatives. For instance, the rather short inflation target horizon implied that the nominal 
exchange rate depreciation could not be made large without jeopardizing the inflation target. This 
would have been costly at times when the Central Bank was still in the process of building its 
anti-inflation credentials. This fear of depreciation was exacerbated by both the perception of a 
rather high pass-through and currency mismatches at the corporate level that may have produced   16
large balance sheet effects. On the fiscal side, political constraints limited the possibility of a 
large fiscal contraction.  
And third, the perception of both persistent, strong domestic demand and difficulties in 
building a credible policy mix led to a continuation of contractionary policies and even larger 
rigidities, particularly in exchange rate policy, over a long period. For policy lags to have visible 
effects, the delay in the availability of real-time data and likely underestimation of the direct 
effects of the external conditions on domestic demand implied that policies became tighter up to 
1998Q3. However, domestic demand had already decelerated markedly at that time and was 
falling by almost 8 percent (year over year) in the next quarter. In parallel, imperfect credibility 
implied that interest rates had to be raised substantially on three occasions, that fiscal policy 
announcements did not have a large impact, and, more importantly, that the exchange rate target 
band had to be narrowed considerably, exacerbating an already rigid policy framework.   
 
4.2. Policy Decisions 
 
During 1998, the policy decisions to confront the effects of the external shocks, which, as 
mentioned before, included a widening in the current account deficit, exchange rate pressures, 
and lower than budgeted fiscal revenues, were actions that mainly pointed at controlling the 
overly strong expansion of domestic demand and regulating the exchange rate depreciation. 
These decisions were made while surrounded by an uncertain environment and emerging 
markets’ financial turbulence, around six months after the devaluation of the baht in Thailand. 
Policy decisions included (i) foreign exchange interventions that were not fully sterilized, with 
significant contractions in market liquidity and effects on interest rates beyond the monetary 
policy reference rate; (ii) sizeable hikes in the monetary policy interest rate; (iii) narrowing of the 
exchange rate target band as a way to signal commitment, and later increasing its width to allow 
for some depreciation; (iv) issuance of foreign exchange index debt by the Central Bank; (v) a 
loosening of capital inflow controls; and (vi) three fiscal adjustment announcements, oriented at 
controlling expenditures. (Table 4 presents a detailed chronogram of different policy 
announcements.)  
Giving as the main reasons the worsening of the international scenario and the need to 
cool down domestic demand growth, the Central Bank increased the monetary policy rate by 50 
basis points (real) at the beginning of 1998. This measure did not preclude the continuation of the   17
first currency attack, to which the Central Bank reacted by selling international reserves and 
constraining liquidity further during the rest of the month. Overnight interest rates in the 
interbank market went up, reaching 90 percent, far above the monetary policy reference rate that 
was supposed to be the benchmark for that market (Figure 11).  
In parallel, on January 19, the Minister of Finance announced a fiscal adjustment package 
equivalent to US$ 170 million. This would materialize through cuts in the investment plans of 
public enterprises and was equivalent to approximately 0.2 percent of GDP. Partly because public 
enterprises’ investment was not part of the budget discussion and the announcement did not 
involve any central government spending adjustments, the effect was modest.  
At the beginning of February, the Central Bank again tightened monetary policy, this time 
with a 150 basis point hike to 8.5 percent (real), pushing policy clearly into contractionary 
territory. Market pressure ceased and normal liquidity conditions were quickly reinstated. The 
exchange rate was very small throughout this period (Figure 12). 
The argument behind the efforts to avoid a large nominal depreciation was twofold. First, 
given the assessment that exchange rate pass-through was rather large in Chile, and that it was 
considerably more so if the economy was overheated, there was little to gain from a nominal 
depreciation in terms of achieving a change in relative prices. Furthermore, given the export 
sector structure, with prominence of commodities that are rather insensitive to relative prices, at 
least in the short run, the effectiveness of the depreciation was questionable. Second, the inflation 
target for 1998 of 4.5 percent appeared quite ambitious given 1997’s actual inflation of 6.1 
percent, and did not leave much room to accommodate a large nominal depreciation.  
Although markets calmed down during the following months, there was concern and 
public discussion regarding whether the policies in place were capable of cooling down growth in 
domestic demand. In April, the government again announced spending cuts, this time equivalent 
to US$ 165 million, involving both the investment plans of public enterprises and central 
government spending. However, in 1998Q1, year over year growth in domestic demand, first 
known in the second half of May (although predictable given the behavior of trade figures), was 
more than 12 percent, higher than 1998Q3 and Q4. The current account deficit was approaching 
6 percent of GDP and year-end forecasts of the deficit were subsequently revised upward (see 
Table 7).    18
In May, the government adjusted the minimum wage and produced an unconditional 
schedule of adjustments for the next two years. The process was particularly troublesome because 
it included a cumulative adjustment of close to 30 percent, well above private sector wage 
increases. In part, it reflected the political cost of the wage restraint of the public sector in 
November of the previous year. According to Cowan et al. (2005), the adjustment had a 
substantially negative effect on labor market dynamics in the following years.  
Market tranquility ended in June, when the peso was again under pressure. At first the 
policy reaction was similar to what it had been in January: partially non-sterilized intervention 
with considerable shrinkage in liquidity. In fact, the cumulative change in four weeks of 
international reserves was quite similar in the two episodes (Figure 13). Again, overnight 
interbank rates shot up, well above the reference rate, reaching 60 percent some days (Figure 11).  
Later, however, on June 25, the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry announced a 
package of measures that included the third fiscal adjustment, this time equivalent to US$ 200 
million through cuts in central government spending. In addition, it included the creation of an 
infrastructure fund with US$ 150 million from one-off revenues from new concessions, and an 
indefinite postponement of military aircraft purchases. The announcement included the 
commitment to restrain expenditures such that they would grow less than output.  
In parallel, the Central Bank narrowed the exchange rate target band to signal a stronger 
commitment to nominal exchange rate stability. The target band width was reduced from +/−12.5 
percent around central parity to +2 and −3.5 percent (Figure 12). The PPP adjustment rule for the 
central parity was maintained, but the real appreciation trend of 2 percent per year in effect at the 
time was abandoned.  
Furthermore, the Central Bank reduced the one-year unremunerated reserve requirement 
on inflows from 30 to 10 percent, and announced that it would begin issuing dollar-indexed debt 
(PRD, “Pagarés Reajustables en Dólares”) and simultaneously offer option contracts. Dollar-
indexed debt would have at least a four-year maturity and the size and exact maturity of issuances 
would be contingent and announced later. Call options for 180 to 360 days were offered at a 
strike price equal to the band’s ceiling. These measures aimed to facilitate the development of the 
hedging market and the adjustment of the private sector’s portfolio, and to support the band’s 
ceiling.    19
The announcements calmed the markets and soon normal liquidity conditions were 
reestablished. One important cost of the package was that it left little of flexibility in case 
conditions continued to deteriorate. Another was the tinkering with the exchange rate band, 
which had already been discredited by other adjustments in the past.  
In August, a new bout of speculation started with the economy still facing prospects of a 
large current account deficit and substantial turmoil stemming from the Russian crisis. The policy 
reaction this time included less direct foreign exchange intervention, but short-term interest rates 
again strongly shot up. This process continued during the first half of September.  
At the beginning of September, with all the market jittering as background, the Central 
Bank presented its annual report to Congress, which included an inflation target of +/−4.3 percent 
for the coming year, a forecast for inflation of +/−4.5 percent in 1998 (against the previously 
announced target of 4.5 percent), and expected GDP growth of 3.8 percent in 1999. The tone of 
the report recognized the complex situation, using phrases such as “The Chilean economy is 
confronting difficult times,” and made clear the necessity to moderate domestic demand in order 
to cope with the adverse international environment and consolidate the progress in inflation 
control.  
A few days later, against the background of continued financial turmoil, the Central Bank 
of Chile announced a new policy package that included raising the monetary policy interest rate 
from 8.5 to 14 percent (real), widening the exchange rate target band, and planning to widen it 
further gradually. The target band width was increased from +2 and −3.5 percent to +/−3.5 
percent around the central parity. During the rest of the year, this width would increase smoothly, 
reaching +/−5 percent by year’s end. The central parity of the target continued to have a PPP rule, 
this time including the inflation target, not past inflation. Finally, the URR was set to 0 for all 
operations. Interestingly, the interest rate hike was portrayed as a way to lower market rates, 
which indeed happened very fast. The measures were supposed to foster inflation convergence to 
the target and control the current account deficit. The communiqué also hinted that the 
government intended to make additional fiscal efforts.    
One month after tightening the monetary policy, the Central Bank started an easing 
process, ending 1998 with the monetary policy interest rate at 7.8 percent (real), while it widened 
the exchange rate target band even further than originally announced.    20
Analysis of the 1999 budget formally started in Congress in October. The public 
discussion still revolved around excess domestic spending and the progress of the adjustment 
effort. For instance, in his speech to Congress presenting the 1999 budget, the Minister of 
Finance argued that the policy measures were working, taming domestic demand, based on a 
number of statistics that supported this view. Still, the budget included a forecast of a current 
account deficit of 6.8 percent of GDP for the current year (with 5 percent GDP growth). The 
proposed budget was supposed to be coherent with a current account deficit of 4 percent of GDP 
in 1999 (or US$ 4.0 to 4.5 billion), based on a 1999 GDP growth assumption of 3.8 percent. 
Regarding fiscal policy, the budget considered total expenditures to grow close to 2.8 percent and 
a global fiscal surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP. A special focus effort was made in an attempt to 
maintain expenditures in social programs: “social spending” (two-thirds of the total) would 
increase by 6.3 percent and the rest would decrease by 4.6 percent. The budget was dubbed 
“Adjustment with Solidarity.”  
During this policy reaction phase, there was neither special financing from the 
International Monetary Fund nor the use of special credit facilities with foreign counterparts from 
the government’s perspective. Some loans related to specific projects funded by other 
multinationals continue to be granted, although without any significant macroeconomic role. 
Between December 1997 and December 1998, the public sector’s external debt increased by US$ 
300 million. Beyond the issuance of dollar-indexed debt by the Central Bank, there were no other 
major adjustments to debt management policy.
10 
Because of the surprising weakness of domestic demand and GDP by the end of 1998 and 
the beginning on 1999, both monetary and fiscal policies were adjusted to boost the economy. 
Between January and July 1999, the monetary policy interest rate was cut by 220 basis points to 5 
percent (real). At the time, as is clear in the communication of the monetary policy rate increases 
in early 2000, that interest rate level was considered somewhat expansionary. 
Fiscal policy, in turn, was recalibrated in June and again in August 1999, to make it 
clearly expansionary. The increasing unemployment rate, which jumped from 6.1 percent in June 
1998 to more than 11 percent a year later, was a key determinant of this package. Another was 
the weak performance of construction. The expansionary fiscal package included (i) a special 
                                                 
10 Due to historical reasons, the bulk of domestic public debt was on the Central Bank’s books. During the second 
half of the 1990s, its policy was to roll over this debt, without major changes in composition and controlling its 
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public investment program; (ii) moving regional investments forward over time; (iii) a special tax 
break for housing purchases; (iv) a debt rescheduling program for small and medium enterprises; 
and (v) direct employment programs that benefited close to 1 percent of the labor force. These 
and other measures were equivalent to 0.8 percent of GDP, although their fiscal cost was deferred 
in some cases, such as for the tax break.  
After the fact, there is the valid question of why macroeconomic policies took so long to 
adjust to the new situation of weakness in 1999. One probable reason is the combination of lack 
of real-time evidence of the state of the economy, the still volatile foreign scenario for some time, 
and the complexities of re-calibrating an adequate macro impulse after a large shock, particularly 
the evaluation of the consequences of the illiquidity episodes of 1998.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in the midst of the 1998 episode, in his speech to 
Congress, the President announced that the flat tariff was to be reduced from 11 to 5 percent. 
This reaffirmed the strong commitment of the government to trade integration, and completely 
rejected protection as a way to cope with the 1998 shock.  
 
4.3. Policy Effects 
 
From a broad perspective, monetary policy was most contractionary in 1998, even beyond what 
the policy rate hikes describe given the illiquidity episodes. Particularly important were those 
periods when the interest rate level precluded banks from lending because of the maximum 
interest rate regulations in place in Chile.
11 Although impossible to quantify, it is likely that this 
development had non-linear effects on the economy. It probably affected private expectations, as 
the Minister of Finance’s 2000 budget speech to Congress admits. Standard measures also 
demonstrate that the monetary policy stance was tight. The average 90-day Central Bank note’s 
real interest rate was more than 9 percent during 1998, a level without precedent. M1, the 
preferred money aggregate used in monetary policy analysis in Chile, declined by 8 percent, 
again something not seen in several years. Céspedes et al. (2006) report that a standard Taylor 
rule estimated for Chile shows very large positive shocks during this period. In particular, this 
rule shows shocks on the order of 9 percent for 1998Q3, with high statistical significance.  
According to estimates based on the Central Bank of Chile’s Central Aggregate Demand 
Macroeconomic Model (MODA), the effect of the interest rate increase differs considerably 
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across demand components.
12 A one-year 100 basis point interest rate shock would generate after 
one year a decline (year over year) in investment in machinery and equipment and in durable 
consumption in the range of 4 to 8 percent. The effect of the same shock on non-durable 
consumption and construction is in the vicinity of 1 percent (Figure 14). Both the domestic 
demand adjustment and the differentiated reaction of its components are broadly coherent with 
what happened in 1998-99.  
Although it is difficult to evaluate it precisely, fiscal policy apparently did not contribute 
to attenuate the private expansion in 1998. Alternative measures of fiscal impulse show a positive 
sign, in the range of 1 to 2 percent of GDP (Table 5). In part this is due to the fact that the 1998 
budget was approved under very different economic conditions in 1997. But it also owes to the 
size of the fiscal adjustments. The budget considered an increase in expenditures “with 
macroeconomic effects” of 7.5 percent.
13 With the adjustment, expenditures decreased to 5.5 
percent, above GDP growth of 3.2 percent. Furthermore, if simple fiscal impulses are calculated 
using actual ex-post data for both 1997 and 1998 instead of the amended budget for 1998 and the 
budget for 1997, the fiscal impulse appears even larger.  
It should be mentioned that fiscal policy ended up being expansionary and very 
countercyclical in 1999, supporting weak domestic demand. Given the decline in GDP, the 
positive fiscal impulse of 1999 can be regarded as necessary to offset the private contraction. All 
in all, that year Chile had, for the first time in more than a decade, a fiscal deficit.  
Interventions and the issuance of dollar-indexed debt by the Central Bank changed its 
exchange rate exposure—and, therefore, that of the rest of the economy with the opposite sign—
materially, although one could argue ex post that interventions could have been even larger (see 
below). In 1998, the Central Bank reduced its international reserves by US$ 3.2 billion, its net 
position payable in dollars by US$ 3.4 billion, and its total net position in dollars by US$ 4.7 
billion. These compare to international reserves of US$ 19.1 billion at the end of 1997 (Figure 
15).   
The overall and most important effect of both external shocks and policies was to cool 
down domestic demand. It is clear that this happened to a much larger extent than had been 
                                                 
12 This is based on an update of the model presented in Banco Central de Chile (2003).  
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retiring workers who contributed in the old pay-as-you-go system), and financial assets purchases, and includes 
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anticipated and in a very sudden way. Put differently, the adjustment was unexpectedly large and 
quick, although it took a few quarters to materialize. Imports of goods and services (volumes) 
transited from growing 16 percent year over year in 1998Q2 to falling −14 percent in 1998Q4. 
Behind this adjustment was a sudden drop in domestic demand of almost 8 percent year over year 
in 1998Q4, which was particularly concentrated in investment in fixed capital formation (−17.3 
percent) and durables consumption (−24.4 percent), both of which continued to deepen their 
adjustments in the following quarter.  
The real exchange rate adjustment while domestic demand was cooling down was quite 
small. As mentioned before, up to the first half of 1999, the real exchange rate barely moved in 
comparison with its level at the end of 1997. Later it depreciated, but this was not part of the 
initial adjustment process. In so far as avoiding a source of inflation or balance sheet effects, the 
strategy of controlling the degree of nominal depreciation was a successful one.  
The extent of the adjustment in domestic demand was a major surprise for both authorities 
and market analysts. The expected current account deficit for 1998—and, most noticeably, for 
1999—was substantially above actual figures (Table 7). Around 1998Q3, the Consensus 
Forecast’s mean expected current account deficit for 1998 was US$ 5.4 billion, whereas the 
Central Bank’s and the Ministry of Finance’s were close to US$ 5.2 billion. The first reading 
published in 1999 was US$ 4.5 billion. Interestingly, the Consensus projection was increased 
every quarter of that year, hence the sudden character of the adjustment. The figures are even 
more striking for the current account deficit in 1999. Around 1998Q3, projections ranged 
between US$ 4.3 billion (Ministry of Finance) and US$ 4.7 billion (Market). The first reading 
was a balanced current account.   
This same pattern, although somewhat more attenuated and deferred, is observed in the 
actual dynamics and forecasts for GDP growth (Figure 16). GDP growth, with base year 1986 
(which was the one used at the time), declined from 6 percent in 1998Q3 to around 1 percent in 
1999Q1. The 1999 forecast of both the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance announced in 
September 1998 soon became outdated, and the same happened to the Consensus projections. In 
fact, these last projections remained in positive territory even during 1999Q2.  
With this intense adjustment of domestic demand, the performance indicators of the 
banking system certainly deteriorated, but they did so within ranges that did not jeopardize 
overall stability. System-wide non-performing loans increased especially between 1998Q2 and   24
1999Q1, but remained below 2 percent (Figure 17). The largest increases were concentrated in 
commercial credit, which did not recuperate until several years later, and consumer loans, which 
did not recover until 2000. Delinquency in housing credit increased but remained low. Provisions 
increased up to 2.5 percent of assets in 1999, driving profitability slightly below 10 percent in 
1999 from numbers close to 14 percent the four years previous to the sudden stop episode. 
Capital remained well above the Basel standards (Table 3). The relatively normal functioning of 
the banking system did not preclude credit from growing very little in 1999, only 2.4 percent on 
average compared with more than 20 percent before the shocks. Overall, with these figures it is 
not possible to establish that it was a banking-system-driven credit crunch. Despite the very high 
interest rates in January and July, credit did not suffer large instant contractions.
14 
   Finally, regarding inflation, it should first be mentioned that the 12-month CPI declined 
from 6.3 percent in 1997Q3, to 4.3 percent in 1998Q4, to only 2.5 percent in 199Q4. Core 
inflation dynamics were stickier than the headlines and dropped only at the end of 1999. The 
1998 inflation target was achieved exactly (4.5 percent for December), whereas the target in 1999 
was undershot by 2 full percentage points (target 4.3 percent for December), again reflecting the 
rapid and unexpected adjustment of domestic demand.  
Private inflation expectations for 1998 were always above the target at that time (Figure 
18). They reached a peak of 5.2 percent (that is, 0.7 percentage point above target) in February 
1998 after the first currency attack. Later, they declined slowly toward the target and did not 
increase again despite the financial turmoil. Inflation credibility was very well protected during 
this period except at the beginning of the year.  
The market’s reactions to the policy measures were mixed (Table 8, first panel).  The only 
package that clearly produced “positive” effects in market sentiment was the September one. 
Despite the fact that it included a large rise in the monetary policy interest rate, the policy 
announcements allowed a 33 percent decline in the overnight interest rate and a 7 percent 
increase in the stock market (over and above what happened in the Dow Jones, taken as a 
control). The other policy packages, particularly the fiscal announcements, did not improve 
market sentiment in any clear way. In line with these results, the evaluation behind the 
declarations of analysts and other opinion-makers, expressed in the major newspapers, was 
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major distress in the financial system. Perhaps the largest problem was related to the illiquidity episodes and their 
temporary effects on credit due to the interest rate ceiling.     25
positive in September (Table 8, second panel). The first packages did not produce meaningful 
effects and generally were evaluated in a heterogeneous manner in the newspapers.  
 
4.4. Policy Constraints 
 
The policy decisions throughout 1998 and 1999 were shaped by several considerations. I offer 
here an interpretation of the most important constraints faced by policymakers.  
In the decision about how much of a depreciation to tolerate, there was a strong 
presumption that with domestic demand growing clearly above the GDP growth rate, the 
inflationary consequences would have been large and the effect on relative prices small. Pass-
through coefficients were considered at the time to be above 50 percent over a one-year period, 
and even 70 percent given the stage of the cycle (Central Bank of Chile, 2000). In part, this 
strong inflationary effect was due to the conjecture that real wages were quite sticky given 
indexation. That meant that, to be able to accomplish the inflation target, the depreciation had to 
be very small. Ex-post estimates of the pass-through coefficient for Chile are in range 10 to 20 
percent, considerably below earlier estimates.
15 High inflation persistence, which was indeed in 
the data, probably affected ex-ante estimates of the pass-through. This persistence, in turn, partly 
reflected the gradual adjustments in inflation targets and the existence of a PPP rule for the 
exchange rate band in the 1990s. Later, without these factors, inflation persistence declined 
markedly.  
A second constraint for monetary and exchange rate policy was the perceived degree of 
liability dollarization and the balance sheet effect that this could bring about (Massad, 2003). 
This concern was rooted first in the traumatic experience of Chile in 1982, when a depreciation 
following a fixed regime generated problems for the financial system. Second, after several years 
of high domestic interest rates (vis-à-vis external ones) and smooth real appreciation, dollar debt 
was more important on firms’ balance sheets. Microeconomic data were scarce at the time, so the 
exact situation was not perfectly known. Cowan et al. (2006a) show that, for a sample of 
corporate firms registered at the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, dollar debt (net of 
hedging) increased from 8 percent to more than 10 percent of total assets between 1995 and 
1998. This debt represented more than 26 percent of corporate liabilities. Aggregate data show 
that total liabilities of the non-household, non-financial system private sector were close to 100 
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percent of GDP in 1998, with external debt at approximately 42 percent.
16 Although commercial 
banks were basically matched due to regulations, corporate clients may not have been, opening 
up the possibility of substantial credit risk.
17  
A third constraint for monetary and exchange rate policy was the way the former was 
implemented in practice. Mechanisms for managing liquidity were not fully developed in 1998, 
leaving interest rates as the only mechanism for adjustment in periods of low liquidity, and 
substantially volatile. Specifically, there was a fixed amount of discount funds available to banks 
(not the arrangement of a corridor that many central banks use nowadays). Moreover, 
collateralized repo operations were not part of the Central Bank’s toolkit. This generated the 
possibility of huge discrepancies between the monetary policy interest rate and actual rates, an 
option that the Central Bank used intensely. At the same time, the adjustment mechanisms in 
case interest rates increased beyond reasonable levels were too rough and not able to quickly 
avoid spikes in interest rates.  
As regards fiscal policy, there was the political constraint mentioned above, in terms of 
the support for tighter fiscal policy. The minimum wage setting decision in 1998, whereby it was 
substantially increased for three years, indicates that constructing the political backing for a 
major fiscal adjustment was difficult.   
Finally, there was an important constraint arising from the diagnosis that could be put 
together given real-time data vs. an ex-post evaluation. In particular, in real time it was not 
possible to recognize the decline in import prices that was happening in tandem with the drop in 
export prices (Figures 19 and 20). Ex post, terms of trade in 1998 declined less than 3 percent. At 
the time, estimates were around 12 percent, making the current account situation even more 
acute. Something related happened with domestic demand. Given delays in data gathering, it was 
impossible to evaluate the depth of the adjustment in real time (Figure 21).  
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17 Cowan et al. (2006) show that properly measured, that is, taking into account all sources of mismatches, there is a 
strong balance sheet effect in Chile. They also show that firms with real hedges have more dollar debt, and that 
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5. Policy Responses Mark II: An Overhaul of the Macro Policy Framework
18  
 
In the second half of 1999, the Central Bank began to implement a number of changes in its 
macroeconomic policy framework. Later, in 2000, fiscal policy was also reformed and a strict 
fiscal rule was announced. Although there was an evident official negative evaluation of the 
previous policy framework, the origin of these developments can be traced to the combination of 
a reaction to the aftermath of the 1997-98 shock, particularly the recession it generated, and the 
growing international consensus at the time regarding the benefits of flexibility cum inflation 
targeting. In particular, Banco Central de Chile (1999) explains these changes as improvements 
that were coherent with the following considerations: inflation had already converged to low 
levels; greater exchange rate flexibility was possible, given the development of hedging 
mechanisms and lower mismatches; and there was a need to accommodate transitory inflation 
shocks and a longer time span for monetary policy to affect inflation (and thus prevent 
unnecessary output volatility).  
The changes in the macroeconomic policy regime in 1999-2001 included: (i) the adoption 
of a free-floating exchange rate regime; (ii) the deepening of the foreign exchange derivatives 
(forward) market; (iii) the implementation of a full-fledged inflation targeting system to guide 
monetary policy; (iv) the total opening of the capital account; (v) the use of an explicit fiscal 
policy rule for the central government; and (vi) the nominalization of monetary policy. 
The gradual transition to a floating exchange rate system was pursued with the adoption 
of a widening exchange rate band in December 1998. After ten months in which the band’s width 
was increased from 7 to 16 percent of the central parity, the Central Bank announced in 
September 1999 that the band was no longer in the policy framework. The Central Bank 
officially retained the authority to intervene, but it announced that it would do so only in special 
circumstances, and it would inform the public about those decisions. In parallel to this “slow” 
transition to a floating regime—which, remarkably, did not entail an especially abrupt movement 
in the foreign exchange rate—the Central Bank made the regulatory adjustments necessary to 
foster the development of foreign exchange hedging. In particular, it eased banking regulations to 
allow banks to participate more actively in the forward market. Volumes increased rapidly. 
Between 1998 and 2003, total turnover volume in the derivatives market increased by 60 percent, 
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while the spot market more than doubled. The Central Bank intervened in the foreign exchange 
market in only two episodes (each about three months long), in 2001 and 2002.
19  
The inflation-targeting framework was enhanced in several dimensions, becoming a 
standard representative of this type of regime. In September 1999, an ongoing target band of 2−4 
percent was announced as the new inflation target starting in 2001 (the interim target for 
December 2000 was 3.5 percent). The Central Bank began publishing an inflation report three 
times a year (the first issue being released in May 2000), announced monthly monetary policy 
meeting dates six months in advance, and disclosed monetary policy meeting minutes with a 
three-month delay—a period that was subsequently shortened to three weeks. Overall, these 
efforts improved markedly the disclosure of information, including detailed forecasts and views 
about transmission mechanisms. Procedural changes were enacted in a new Central Bank Board 
ruling. 
As regards fiscal policy, the new administration announced in 2000 that during the next 
six years it would follow a rule for determining total expenditures. The rule, known as the 1-
percent structural surplus rule, aimed at ensuring a 1-percent surplus for the central government 
every year considering structural revenues, measured as cycle-adjusted tax revenues and what 
could be considered a “normal” copper price. The 1-percent target was explained as necessary to 
cover the recurrent Central Bank deficit, as a means to save copper wealth for future generations, 
and as insurance against contingent liabilities (see Ministerio de Hacienda, 2000). The rule 
allowed for improved communication about the fiscal position, separated cyclical from structural 
changes, and, because it was accompanied by an important fiscal restraint, helped to improve 
credibility.
20 
The capital account was completely opened in 2001, although the Central Bank retained 
its authority to impose restrictions. After years of following a strategy of gradual integration, the 
Central Bank totally opened up the capital account. This development was accompanied by fewer 
restrictions for the international allocation of funds managed by the private pension system. 
In 2001, the Central Bank “nominalized” its monetary policy. In August of that year, it 
switched from a CPI-indexed or UF-referenced interest rate (a real rate) to a nominal referenced 
interest rate. When it was implemented, the monetary policy interest rate was UF + 3.5 percent. 
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Afterward it was 6.5 percent. This change allowed the Central Bank to lower the real interest rate 
into negative territory in 2003.
21  
It is interesting to compare the reaction of the economy under the new macroeconomic 
framework with the external shock of 2001-02, which entailed both real and financial factors, and 
the reaction it had in 1998-99. Of course, the initial conditions—particularly the issue of excess 
domestic demand—and shocks were different, so it is unsafe to draw strong conclusions. 
However, during this episode, monetary policy turned strongly countercyclical in 2002-03 and 
the real exchange rate depreciated by almost 20 percent between the beginning of 2001 and the 
beginning of 2003.  
 
6. The Chilean 1998 Episode in Perspective 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Chile’s policy response in 1998 has been considered a 
successful one in the context of other well-known sudden stop episodes, e.g., Argentina in 2001 
and Chile in 1982. In these other episodes, financial system problems exacerbated the initial 
shock and the result was a large drop in GDP and massive unemployment. At the same time, 
however, if Chilean policymakers and academics were asked to evaluate the 1998 policy 
response in Chile, many of them would probably term this episode as rather inefficient, with 
suboptimal coordination between the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, and strongly 
influenced by the ex-ante perception of a high pass-through coefficient and large exchange rate 
mismatches. This section evaluates the Chilean case in perspective, comparing it with other 
episodes in a few key dimensions. Comparisons across macroeconomic episodes are always 
tricky because there are many dimensions operating simultaneously. I consider here a few that 
are useful for measuring whether the episode is an outlier, in particular regarding the composition 
of the shock, its size, and the performance of the economy during and after the shock.
22  
The second perspective I consider is the size of the shock faced by the Chilean economy 
in 1998. This is done by comparing the Chilean case with 54 other cases identified by Cowan et 
al. (2006) based on the sudden stop definition in Guidotti et al. (2004).
23 In particular, I construct 
three measures of shock severity for 55 cases considering the size of the capital account reversal 
                                                 
21 See Fuentes et al. (2003) for a description and evaluation.  
22 The purpose is to compare Chile in 1998 relative to other episodes. Ortiz et al. (1997) evaluate in absolute terms 
the effects of policy responses in sudden stops.  
23 A sudden stop exists if flows decrease by more than one standard deviation from the mean and this change is 
larger that 5 percent of GDP, everything with annual data.    30
(without reserves) in each case and comparing it with alternative scale variables: (i) financial 
integration measured as the sum of the country’s gross international assets and liabilities; (ii) 
GDP, and (iii) total trade measured as exports plus imports. Admittedly, focusing only on 
quantities is an incomplete description of a sudden stop because prices (sovereign risk spreads in 
particular) should also contain valuable information. Data on prices, however, are more limited. 
Furthermore, due to dual causality, a well managed event could probably appear as facing a 
milder shock in the comparison here if the event evolves to a larger crisis.  
Notwithstanding these and other caveats, this comparison shows that, although the shock 
Chile faced was sizeable, it was not that different from other episodes.
24 The change in private 
net flows was equivalent to almost 5 percent of the sum of gross international assets and 
liabilities, almost 6 percent of GDP, and more than 10 percent of total trade. In comparison with 
the other episodes, Chile was in the 27th percentile in the first two scales and the 40th percentile 
in the third one. (Figure 22 shows the kernel distributions for the three measures and the relative 
position of Chile.) And it is not the case that the Chilean shock can be regarded as a small one by 
international standards.  
The third perspective considered here is the performance of the Chilean economy in 
comparison with others after the sudden stop episode. This is done by comparing the common 
episodes identified by both Cowan et al. (2006) and Calvo et al. (2004),
25 which yields a total of 
14 cases. In each case, the extent of the sudden stop is measured in the same way as before, 
namely as the change in private capital flows in comparison with the three alternative scale 
variables. To measure performance, I consider three alternative indicators: (i) the change in the 
inflation rate between the average one and two years after the shock (t+1, t+2) and the average of 
two years before (t−1, t−2); (ii) the change in GDP growth between t+1 and t−1; and (iii) the 
level of average growth in t+1 and t+2 minus trend growth, calculated with a standard HP filter 
with data up to 2006 (using the September 2006 WEO database).  
Partly because of the relatively small number of cases considered here for comparison, I 
assess Chile’s performance by simply evaluating its position relative to a trend line drawn in each 
of the nine pairs of shock and performance indicators. Figure 23 presents the results, with the 
                                                 
24 Calvo et al. (2003) reach the same conclusion comparing the size of the current account turnaround as a 
percentage of the domestic absorption of tradable goods using imports as a proxy for domestic absorption of 
tradables. Considering the usual tradable sector in GDP as the proxy, the “leveraged absorption” was around 17 
percent.    
25 See Table 9.    31
larger square representing Chile. Overall, it indicates that Chile did a fairly good job regarding 
inflation—it is clearly below the trend line under the three shock measures—and was quite close 
to average regarding growth (slightly positive in one of the six cases considered).
26 
Finally, the fourth perspective considered here is the policy mix adopted during the 
episode. Because of data limitations, fiscal policy is not analyzed. Drawing on Calvo et al. 
(2004), plus real exchange rate data, the Chilean policy mix is compared by analyzing the 
shock’s size, the current account reversal after the shock, the international reserves lost, the 
average change in real interest rates, and the real exchange rate depreciation in the context of the 
other episodes (Table 9). Again, given the sample size, conclusions should be taken with care. 
Comparing ranks in these dimensions, and considering the size of the shock, it is clear that the 
Chilean adjustment was comparatively not intensive in selling international reserves (ranked 2nd 
of 14 in terms of the least drop in reserves), involved only a mild real exchange rate depreciation 
(ranked 5th), and included a relatively higher real interest rate (ranked 8th). If one had asked a 
Chilean observer, the answer probably would not have been different. This conclusion bodes well 
with those of Ortiz et al. (2007) regarding the benefits and costs of tighter macroeconomic 
policies in sudden stop episodes.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The Chilean 1998 episode offers some policy lessons that may be useful. To begin, this episode 
was clearly a successful one from the standpoint of avoiding a major collapse in the economy 
while there was a large turnaround of net capital flows. Many features of the economy and the 
policy reaction can explain this result, but probably the most important ones are the resilience of 
the financial system and the low vulnerability of public finances. Having capitalized, well 
regulated, and supervised banks made it possible to have quite a contractionary monetary policy 
without overly jeopardizing the health of the system. Avoiding liquidity risks in government 
financing was another feature that made it possible both to substantially increase interest rates 
and to run a countercyclical fiscal policy later in the episode.  
At the same time, however, it can be argued—perhaps with hindsight—that the 
adjustment could have been more efficient if relative prices had changed more (particularly the 
                                                 
26 A different perspective considers how long it took Chile to recover. This was a vivid debate in Chile in 2004-05. 
See Box 1 in the Central Bank of Chile’s Monetary Policy Report of September 2005. GDP dynamics in 2001-02 
were influenced by the US cycle of 2001 and financial turmoil in Latin America.    32
real exchange rate and real wages) and if the contraction in domestic demand had been milder. In 
comparison with other episodes, the Chilean case appears to have resulted in a rather small 
decline in international reserves, higher interest rates, and a less significant adjustment in the real 
exchange rate. The adjustment did not include an important role for switching effects. It is clear 
that it was necessary to be “tough” in order to be credible and to have effects in the current 
account soon enough. However, this also implied that the adjustment was deeper. Although 
difficult to evaluate in real time, exchange rate pass-through may be low if the economy is not 
overheated, as proved in 1999, and the nominal anchor is clear. Moreover, exchange rate risk 
seems to be important, but better managed by the private sector than earlier thought. Most likely, 
both pass-through and mismatches are highly endogenous.  
Sudden jumps and excessively high interest rates may have non-linear effects and strong 
influence on private expectations. This appeared to be the case in Chile. Letting interest rates 
differ largely from the target of monetary policy can become detrimental for the very credibility 
of monetary policy. If the Central Bank cannot control interest rates, who can? Operational rules 
in the money market, including facilities for accessing liquidity, are keys in this regard.  
Buying credibility in the short run through the announcement of extremely restrictive 
policy rules, such as the narrowing of the exchange rate band, entails important risks if 
fundamentals deteriorate more later (as they did in the Russian default) and warrant a policy 
response that is not possible within those restrictive rules. Beyond the more costly adjustment 
due to the lack of flexibility, many times the policy rule has to be corrected to cope with the new 
environment, against previous announcements and with costs in terms of credibility. Non-
contingent policy decisions can become detrimental for credibility.  
Improving credibility with fiscal policy announcements is not easy. The counterfactuals 
are difficult to evaluate for market participants and they take time to materialize. Fiscal policy 
announcements were necessary, but apparently did not have major effects on market perception. 
The Chilean case is particular because it involved strong capital outflows rather than a 
violent discontinuance of inflows. The implications of such a characteristic are not evident, but it 
could complicate the simple extrapolation of the experience to other episodes. One possible 
repercussion is that capital may return faster than otherwise. Another is that liquidity 
management could have large effects on the exchange rate, while offering hedging mechanisms 
may have stronger effects. At this stage, these are only hypotheses.    33
Moreover, although it is virtually impossible to distinguish whether it was the adjustment 
in domestic demand that actually determined the change in flows or it was the other way around, 
it is clear that domestic demand adjusted to an overly tight monetary policy in 1998. In this 
regard, monetary policy proved to be quite powerful.  
Finally, it is worth theorizing on how the Chilean economy could react today to such an 
episode, considering the policy framework in place. First, given the policy regime—floating 
exchange rate, free capital mobility, etc.—there are no major financial incentives to flows to 
arbitrage away interest rate differentials that could become persistent. In principle, imminent 
flows would adjust the exchange rate. At the same time, exchange rate risk has become more 
evident for the private sector. This should lower the probability of an excess spending pattern to 
begin with or at least as one source for it. Moreover, given the steadier but lower output growth 
of the economy in recent years, the probability that this vulnerability would arise is lower today 
than it was in the 1990s. And if it occurs, there is also the possibility of tightening up financial 
regulations to limit risks.  
If there were a sudden turnaround of private capital flows, it is possible to imagine that 
one or more of the following could materialize. If the Central Bank considers that the situation 
causes a “special circumstance” in the foreign exchange market, with an overreaction of the 
parity that is counterproductive for the functioning of the economy, it may decide to intervene. In 
light of the experiences of 2001 and 2002, it may announce a certain period of time in which it 
could sell some amount of reserves and/or hedges, perhaps announcing the sale and making clear 
that there is no price target. Most likely, this intervention would be almost fully sterilized. 
Monetary policy implementation practices, including the facility that automatically offers 
liquidity to the system in a collateralized operation, makes it difficult for interest rates to be too 
different from the monetary policy interest rate.  
If the situation threatens inflation to be different from 3 percent for too long or 
jeopardizes the credibility of the inflation target, the Central Bank could modify the monetary 
policy stance. In particular, if the inflation forecast (due, for instance, to effects of exchange rate 
movements, aggregate demand dynamics, etc.) differs from 3 percent in a two-year horizon, it 
would probably modify the monetary policy strategy.  
Fiscal policy would not be modified if the evaluation is that the structural parameters—
potential output and the long-term price of copper—have not changed. If the evaluation is that   34
they have indeed changed, the authority would have to consider whether to adjust expenditures 
in the current year or wait for next year’s budget exercise. The size of the adjustment would have 
to be consistent with attaining a structural surplus target. In 2003, when structural nominal 
revenues were revised downward due to a disinflation shock, spending was adjusted right away.  
Given the substantial liquidity in dollars that the government has accumulated in recent 
years due to high copper prices—it has become a net creditor since 2006—potential financial 
needs could be self-financed. For this reason, it is difficult to think of an illiquidity problem. 
Furthermore, by varying the composition of its portfolio, the government could try to attenuate 
extreme swings of the exchange rate. On the side of the private sector, it is also the case that, on 
average, it has improved its foreign exchange liquidity (e.g., pension funds currently have more 
than 30 percent of their portfolio invested abroad), although this is not an even situation for each 
particular sector or agent. However, recurring stress tests done in the Central Bank’s Financial 
Stability Report show that a substantial depreciation could be absorbed by the system.  
All in all, the exchange rate should play a larger role in an adjustment process in Chile 
today in comparison with the 1998 episode. This indeed happened in 2001-03, when the 
economy faced low terms of trade and the real exchange rate depreciated close to 30 percent in 
comparison with its level in 1997-98. In that case, monetary policy was clearly countercyclical.  
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Table 1. Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators and External Conditions, 1994-2001  
(% annual change unless otherwise noted) 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP 5.7 10.6 7.4 6.6  3.2 -0.8 4.5 3.4
Domestic demand   5.5 16.2 7.9 7.2  3.7 -5.8 6.0 2.4
  Private consumption   8.2 9.8 9.4 6.6  4.7 -1.0 3.7 2.9
  Fixed capital formation   6.1 23.1 9.1 10.5  1.9 -18.2 8.9 4.3
Exports (goods and services)  11.6 11.0 11.9 11.2  5.2 7.3 5.1 7.2
Imports (goods and services)  10.2 25.1 11.8 13.2  6.7 -9.5 10.1 4.1
 
Current account (% GDP)  -2.6 -1.5 -4.1 -4.4  -5.0 0.1 -1.3 -1.7
Domestic savings (%GDP)  21.1 23.8 23.1 23.1  21.8 21.0 20.6 20.6
Real exchange rate (1996 = 100)  111.7 105.1 100.0 92.2  91.7 96.3 100.3 111.4
 
Inflation target (Dec/Dec)  9 to 11 9.0 (8.0) 6.5 5.5  4.5 4.3 3.5 3.0
CPI inflation (Dec/Dec)  8.8 8.0 6.5 6.1  4.5 2.3 4.5 2.6
CPIX1 inflation (Dec/Dec)  11.4 6.8 7.4 4.7  7.0 2.1 2.2 2.7
 
Trading partners’ GDP  4.0 3.0 3.1 3.6  2.4 2.7 3.7 1.3
Copper price (US cts. / pound)  104.9 133.2 103.9 103.2  75.0 71.4 82.3 71.6
Terms of trade  13.0 14.0 -13.3 0.0  -2.5 2.8 2.7 -4.2
 
Real Libor (%)  2.1 3.2 2.6 3.4  4.0 3.2 3.2 0.9
EMBI Chile (bp)  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 173 197 192
EMBI Latin America (bp)  n.a. n.a. n.a. 467  698 843 664 866
Corporate spread Chile (bp)  n.a. n.a. 100 111  236 271 253 284
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, JPMorgan.  
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Table 2. Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators and External Conditions, 1997Q3-1999Q4 
(% annual change unless otherwise noted)  
 
1997Q3 1997Q4 1998Q1 1998Q2 1998Q3  1998Q4 1999Q1 1999Q2 1999Q3 1999Q4
GDP 7.4 8.2 6.8 5.6 3.2  -2.3 -2.5 -4.1 -1.1 4.8
Domestic demand  9.7 9.6 12.3 7.5 4.4  -7.6 -8.5 -10.1 -6.5 2.5
   Fixed capital formation  13.9 16.3 11.8 14.6 2.0  -17.3 -19.9 -25.6 -21.1 -4.8
Exports (goods and services)  7.7 13.1 2.4 9.0 5.4  4.5 6.6 7.4 7.4 7.9
Imports (goods and services)  15.6 17.2 20.8 15.5 8.7  -13.5 -12.8 -13.1 -11.1 -0.1
 
12-month cum. current acc. (% GDP)  -3.8 -4.3 -5.8 -6.3 -6.5  -5.0 -3.4 -2.1 -0.6 0.1
Real exchange rate (1996 = 100)  90.6 89.9 91.6 91.3 92.2  91.9 92.6 92.1 97.8 102.5
 
CPI inflation   5.7 6.3 5.6 5.2 4.9  4.3 3.7 4.0 3.3 2.5
CPIX1 inflation  4.9 4.6 5.2 5.6 5.7  6.8 6.0 5.5 4.5 2.8
 
Terms of trade (goods and serv.)  2.6 -3.4 -4.2 -3.6 -2.0  -0.4 2.8 0.8 2.6 5.1
Copper price (US cts. / pound)  103.1 86.9 77.2 78.4 74.4  70.1 63.7 66.4 76.2 78.8
US$ unit price of exports (goods)  -0.5 -5.9 -16.0 -15.9 -15.4  -13.5 -9.2 -5.6 3.6 10.6
US$ unit price of imports (goods)  -2.8 -3.5 -10.5 -9.2 -11.8  -12.4 -8.6 -9.8 -4.3 -0.6
 
Real Libor (%)  3.5 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.0  3.8 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.5
EMBI Chile (bp)  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 188 187 153
EMBI Latin America (bp)  n.a. 467 464 483 877  962 992 780 891 711
Corporate spread Chile (bp)  108 132 171 170 241  363 308 257 284 236
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, JPMorgan. 
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Table 3. Banking System Indicators, 1995-2001 
(% unless otherwise noted) 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000 2001
Capital / risk-weighted assets   10.5 10.5 11.5 12.5  13.5 13.3 12.7
Profits / equity  12.9 15.5 13.7 11.5  9.4 12.7 17.7
Provisions / loans  1.41 1.34 1.43 1.91  2.53 2.51 2.36
Non-performing loans (% of loans)  0.91 0.95 0.97 1.45  1.67 1.73 1.62
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.   40
Table 4. Main Macroeconomic and Financial Policy Decisions in Chile, 1997Q3-1998Q4 
 
Date Policy  decision  Description   Macroeconomic relevance 
1997      
Sep-2  CB cuts MPR by 20bp to UF + 
6.5%. Is a notional interest rate 
indexed to CPI inflation (an ex 
post real interest rate) to guide the 
overnight interbank rate.   
Explanation based on inflation behavior, which is in 
line with an orderly consolidation of the disinflation 
process, and 1997H1output and domestic demand 
figures, broadly as expected. 
Fourth interest rate cut of the year of 25bp.  
Sep-10  CB presents annual report to the 
Senate with inflation target for 
1998 and forecast of key macro 
variables.   
Inflation target Dec. 1998 = +/− 4.5%. Expected 
GDP growth = 6.5−7.0%, Current account deficit = 
4% of GDP. 
Standard CB document whereby it lays out forecasts and 
views about the economy. It is presented the month 
before Congress initiates the next year’s budget 
discussion.  
Sep-17  CB announces a series of capital 
account deregulations to facilitate 
the use of derivatives.  
Among others, end of CB previous authorization for 
derivatives with foreign counterparts, end of the 
requirement of having to have a real transaction 
behind the derivative, free access to buy dollars 
forward in the formal market.  
Another step in the gradual international financial 
integration approach followed by the CB. 
Oct-8  Budget sent to Congress for 
discussion and approval.  
Includes 1998 GDP growth assumption = 7%, total 
expenditure growth close to 7%, and a global 
surplus of 0.7% of GDP.  
Sent in the middle of a discussion of an overly strong 
peso. The budget tries not adding to the strong private 
domestic demand, although at the same time the official 
speech is that fiscal policy is rather inefficient in 
affecting the real exchange rate.  
Nov-4  New banking law.    Updates regulations to Basle I standards. Includes 
transparency standards, the possibility of new 
businesses for banks, including cross border, share 
issuances underwriting, factoring, leasing, 
securitization, some insurance selling.  
Capitalization of banks well checked. 
Nov-19  Law with 6% wage adjustment for 
the public sector  (due in 
December) 
Standard annual wage adjustment for public sector 
workers.  
Given actual inflation (6.3% yoy in November) and 
inflation target can be considered cautious. Unions 
considered it insufficient.  
1998      
Jan-8  CB raises MPR 50bp to 7%   Explanation states that it is necessary to cool down 
domestic demand given the new international 
scenario and the goal for the external accounts 
(without details on what are the changes on the 
external scenario).   
Because of indexation, it is an increase of 50bp in the 
real interest rate. In 1990-1997 its average, proxied by a 
90 day CB index paper, was 6.5%, so the new level could 
be considered mildly contractionary.  The monthly 
standard deviation of this proxy rate was 87bp. 50bp was   41
not an atypical dose.  
Between January and September 1997 there was an 
easing cycle that started at MPR of 7%. 
Jan  Strong FX interventions to 
support the peso. 
Timing not possible to determine.    
Jan-12 to 
Jan-29  
Liquidity shrinks and overnight 
interbank rate rises considerably, 
well above MPR.  
Because of both partially sterilized FX intervention 
and lower private sector demand for liquidity, 
market interest rates increase above monetary policy 
target.  
The overnight interest rate reached 90% annual in real 
terms. The costs of funds increased in such a way that 
lending rates were above the maximum legal rate for 
some days, which implied that banks could not lend 
normally.  
Jan-19  First fiscal adjustment package   Minister of Finance announces a fiscal adjustment 
equivalent to US$ 170 million through cuts in 
investment plans of public enterprises. This cut was 
equivalent to 5.5% of public investment.  
Equivalent to approximately 0.2% of GDP. It did not 
involve central government spending adjustments.  
Feb-3  CB raises MPR 150bp to UF + 
8.5% 
Aims to cool down domestic demand and obtain a 
prudent current deficit. CB explicitly states that 
there will be a flexible margin for the interbank 
overnight rate according to market forces.   
Besides clearly pushing the MPR into a contractionary 
zone, the flexibility allowed for the interbank interest rate 
to open up the possibility of non-sterilized interventions 
that not need to be validated by MPR changes. There is 
no commitment to manage liquidity in order have the 
interbank rate close to the MPR.  
Mar-20  Cross-border investments are 
exempted of  URR 
The CB implemented an unremunerated reserve 
requirement (URR) of 30% for one year to capital 
inflows. With this measure domestic banks regained 
competitiveness for external business.  
Limited.  
Mar-21  Second fiscal adjustment package  President announces a fiscal adjustment equivalent 
to US$ 165 million through cuts in investment plans 
of public enterprises and central government 
spending.  
 
Apr-15  CB lowers requirements for 
nationals to issue in external 
markets, although it renews the 
capital account restrictions in 
place.  
Once a year the CB has to renew capital account 
restrictions. This time it eliminated and reduced 
requirements for issuances. Among others, it 
allowed for peso and UF bonds issued 100% abroad 
and eliminated minimum issuance size.  
Another step in the gradual financial integration process.  
May-21  In the annual speech to Congress, 
the President announces a tariff 
reduction from 11% to 6%, 3% 
the first year and 1% the next two 
years.  
Fiscally neutral with hikes in different consumption 
taxes.  
In strong discussions about the impact of the real 
exchange rate appreciation, this tariff reduction was 
expected to improve the performance of the export 
sector. Ultimately, the reduction was phased in 5 years.    42
May-23  Law that increases substantially 
the minimum wage.  
Multi-year adjustment of the minimum wage of 
26%; 12.7% in 1998, 12.4% in 1999, and 10.4% in 
2000. Adjustment for 15-17 year old workers was 
26%. 
Although past adjustments were for one year only, this 
decision included a large adjustment without any 
contingent clause.  Minimum wage becomes binding for 
a relevant portion of low skill workers.  
Jun-1 to 
July-23 
Strong FX interventions to 




Liquidity shrinks and overnight 
interbank rate rises considerably, 
well above MPR. 
Because of both partially sterilized FX intervention 
and lower private sector demand for liquidity, 
market interest rates increase above monetary policy 
target. 
The overnight interest rate reached 60% annual in real 
terms during some days. 
Jun-25 Third  fiscal  adjustment  package.  Minister of Finance announces a fiscal adjustment 
equivalent to US$ 200 million through cuts in 
central government spending. In addition, creation 
of an infrastructure fund with US$ 150 million from 
one-off revenues from new concessions, and an 
indefinite postponement of military aircraft 
purchases.  
Announcement that was strategically coordinated with 
CB announcements regarding FX policy. The package 
included the commitment to restrain expenditures such 
that they grow less that output.  
Jun-25  CB narrows the exchange target 
band.  
FX target band width is reduced from +/−12.5% 
around a central parity to +2 and −3.5%. PPP 
adjustment rule for central parity is maintained but 
eliminated its 2% per year appreciating trend.   
 
Jun-25  CB reduces URR rate from 30 to 
10%. 
  Intention is to reduce the cost of external financing.  
Jun-26  CB announces that it will issue 
dollar-indexed debt (PRD) and 
will offer option contracts. 
PRDs will have at least a 4-year maturity. Size of 
issuance and exact maturity will be contingent. 180 
to 360 day call options are offered at a strike price 
equal to the band ceiling.  
Aims to facilitate the development of the hedging market 
and readjustments of private portfolios, and 
automatically support the band ceiling. A strong 
commitment signal.  
Jul-2  CB allows banks that hold PRDs 
to engage in foreign interest rate 
forward contracts without prior 
permission.  
Aims to facilitate short and long-run FX risk hedge.     
Jul-28  Legislation that improves 
pensions and gives a number of 
incentives to foster savings.   
In 1997, part of the RER appreciation was 
considered to reflect lack of domestic savings. A 
special commission was appointed and some of their 
recommendations were enacted in this law.  
Largely fiscally neutral. Increase in minimum pensions 
financed with hikes in consumption taxes.  
Aug-12 
to Sep-
Liquidity shrinks and overnight 
interbank rate rises considerably, 
Because of both partially sterilized FX intervention 
and tight liquidity, market interest rates increase 
The overnight interest rate reached 50% annual in real 
terms during some days. CPI indexed 90-day CB bank   43
16  well above MPR.  above monetary policy target.  notes averaged 18.9% in the first half of September, 10.6 
percentage points above the average in May. 
Aug-27  URR set to 0 for ADR (shares of 
domestic enterprises sold abroad) 
arbitrage transactions.  
Intended to improve stability of ADR prices.   
Sep-8  CB presents annual report to the 
Senate with inflation target for 
1999 and forecast of key macro 
variables.   
Inflation target Dec. 1999 = +/−4.3%. Expected 
GDP growth = 3.8%, Current account deficit = US$ 
4,500 mill. 
Standard CB document that lays out forecasts and views 
about the economy. It is presented the month before 
Congress initiates the next year’s budget discussion. This 
time it explains the difficult times the economy is facing 
and the logic of the adjustment process: need to moderate 
growth rate given turbulent external scenario and 
consolidate inflation reduction.  
Sep-16  Congress approves law that 
creates an international stock 
exchange (“bolsa offshore”) 
whereby foreign issuances can be 
traded. Law also includes an 
increase in the limit pension funds 
can invest abroad.  
Pension funds’ foreign investment limit increases 
from 12 to 20% with a transition period managed by 
the Central Bank.  
New measures toward financial integration.  
Sep-16  CB increases MPR from UF 
+8.5% to UF+ 14%  
  An overly restrictive MPR, although market rates were 
much higher. Commitment to align overnight rate to 
MPR actually reduces market rates.  
Sep-16  CB widens the FX target band and 
announces plan to widen it 
gradually.  
FX target band width is increased from +2 and 
−3.5% to +/−3.5% around the central parity. During 
the rest of the year this number would increase 
smoothly to +/−5% at year end. Central parity PPP 
rule will include the inflation target, not past 
inflation.  
The start of the exit phase from the macro framework, 
giving more relevance to the inflation target and less 
importance to the XR.  
Sep-16  URR set to 0 for all operations.      
Oct-3  Budget sent to Congress for 
discussion and approval.  
Includes 1999 GDP growth assumption = 3.8%, 
total expenditure growth close to 2.8% and a global 
surplus of 0.2% of GDP. Special attention to focus 
expenditures in social programs. “Social spending” 
(2/3 of total) increases 6.3% while the rest decreases 
by 4.6%.  
Sent just after the third spell of speculative attacks and 
strong monetary policy measures. Budget is considered 
to be “Adjustment with Solidarity.”  A key element in the 
discussion was excess spending in the economy and an 
overly large current account deficit (forecast to be 6.8% 
of GDP in 1998 with 5% output growth). The budget is 
supposed to be coherent with a CA deficit of 4% of GDP 
in 1999 (US$ 4,000 to 4,500 mill.).   44
Oct-13  CB reduces MPR from UF + 14% 
to UF + 12%.  
  
Nov-2  CB reduces MPR from UF + 12% 
to UF + 10%. 
  
Nov-24  CB reduces MPR from UF + 10% 
to UF + 8.5%. 
  
Dec-2  Law with 5% wage adjustment for 
the public sector.  
  Not incompatible with inflation target of +/−4.3% and 
actual inflation of 4.4% (yoy in November) if trend 
productivity is considered.  
Dec-16  CB reduces MPR from UF + 8.5 
to UF + 7.8%. 
  
Dec-16 CB  increase  FX target band 
width. 
FX target band width is increased from +/−5% to 
+/−8% around the central parity. This width would 
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Table 5. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Indicators, 1996-2000  
(% of nominal GDP unless otherwise noted) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total revenues  24.0 23.8 23.5 23.0 24.1
Total expenditures  21.7 21.9 23.1 24.4 24.0
Fiscal impulse   0.3 0.4 1.5 1.8 -1.5
 
Adjusted revenues  23.7 23.5 22.5 21.6 22.8
Adjusted expenditures  21.6 21.5 22.5 24.0 23.7
Adjusted fiscal impulse  0.9 0.1 2.0 2.4 -1.5
 
Structural revenues  23.0 22.5 22.8 23.2 23.7
Adjusted fiscal impulse II  0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 -0.8
 
Conventional balance  2.3 2.0 0.4 -1.5 0.1
Structural balance  1.4 1.1 0.3 -0.8 0.1
 
MPR (%)  7.28 6.87 9.01 5.87 5.26
90-day CB UF-indexed note (%)  7.28 6.81 9.02 5.79 5.43
20-year CB UF-indexed bond (%)  6.11 6.3 7.09 6.44 6.39
M1 (% annual change)  13.0 20.0 -8.3 20.2 2.7
Total credit (% annual change) 
 
24.0 20.4 10.7 2.4 9.0
Source: Marcel et al (2001) and Central Bank of Chile.  
Fiscal impulse refers to the simple change in the fiscal deficit (as % of GDP). Adjusted fiscal impulse refers 
to changes in the “adjusted” deficit, which in turn considers certain transactions and excludes others trying 
to capture changes that affect public sector worth. Adjusted fiscal impulse II considers a structural 
adjustment for copper prices and output gap on revenues.  
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Table 6. Fiscal Stance Adjustments in 1998  
(% of nominal GDP unless otherwise noted) 
 
 Budget  1998 Oct-98








Revenues 22.0 23.3 22.6 23.5
Expenditures 21.3 22.3 22.3 23.1
Surplus 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.4
Fiscal impulse (*)  0.3 0.0 0.7 1.5
Expenditures w/ “macro effect” (**) 
(% annual change) 
 
7.5 5.5 5.5
(*) Calculated with respect to 1997 budget in first three columns and with respect to actual 1997 in the fourth 
column. 
(**) Total expenditures excluding interest payments, “bonos de reconocimiento” and financial asset 
purchases. 
Source: Estado de la Hacienda Pública (1998), Aspectos Macroeconómico del Presupuesto 1998, Marcel et 
al. (2001). 
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Official forecasts / targets 
CB as of September 1997  -3700 n.a.
CB as of September 1998  -5150 -4500
MoF as of October 1998  -5200 -4250
 
Actual 
First reading  -4548 -78.1
Final reading  -3918 99.5
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Table 8. Short-Run Effects and Reception of Key Policy Measures 
 
    Change in 3 day window (*)  Opinions in newspapers  








Positive Neutral Negative Number
   (%) (pp) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Jan-8  MPR hike to UF+ 7%  4.1 3.6 -4.7 35 55 10 20
Jan-19  First fiscal adjustment  0.5 1.7 0.2 29 25 46 28
Feb-3  MPR hike to UF+ 8.5%  -0.2 -24.7 -1.5 43 34 23 56
Mar-21  Second fiscal adjustment  0.1 0.7 0.0 36 27 38 45
Jun-25-26  Third fiscal adjustment   2.9 20.6 -1.0 66 7 27 41
  XR target band narrowed  54 13 33 24
  URR reduction to 10%  78 6 16 32
 PRD  issuance  100 0 0 12
Sep-16  MPR hike to UF+ 14%  -0.7 -33.1 7.0 71 13 16 31
  XR target band widened  80 10 10 30
  URR set to 0%  94 0 6 31
Oct-13  MPR cut to UF+ 12%  -0.7 -2.0 -1.0 79 0 21 29
 
(*) Exchange rate: % change in “dólar observado.”  
Interbank overnight interest rate: change in percentage points.  
Stock market: % in IPSA - % in Dow Jones. 
 
Source: Author’s assessment based on Central Bank of Chile and the following newspapers: El Mercurio, La Tercera, Estrategia, 
El Diario, La Nación, and La Segunda.  
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Table 9. Chile Policy Measures to 1998 Sudden Stop in Perspective 
 
    Through to peak in two-year window  One year 
before vs. 
one after











    (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% change)  (%) (%)
1  Argentina  2001 -8.3 13.4 -48.6  48.05 42.9
2  Chile  1998 -5.7 4.6 -22.3  24.2 5.5
3  Ecuador  1999 -14.3 15.6 -72.9  10.4 -32
4  Indonesia  1997 -5.1 7.4 -24.5  102.2 28.2
5  Korea  1997 -6.1 17.5 -41.4  21.5 15.9
6  Mexico  1994 -4.6 5.3 -85.2  56.1 26.9
7  Peru  1998 -6.5 0.6 -31.5  11 -3.2
8  Philippines  1997 -5.6 6.9 -40.5  20.2 20.5
9  Portugal  1992 -6.5 1.2 -44.1  11.7 0
10  Spain  1992 -4.8 2.5 -35.5  3.7 11.2
11  Sweden  1991 -8.6 0.6 -37.2  68.8 7.9
12  Thailand  1997 -18.7 5.8 -53  17.4 12.6
13  Turkey  2001 -13.7 4 -34.9  209 -1.4
14  Turkey  1994 -7.5 2.4 -10.9  132.1 20.1
 
 
Ranking Chile  5 7 2  8 5
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Calvo et al. (2004), Cowan et al. (2006), JP Morgan, and International Financial Statistics.    50
Figure 1. Total Flows as (Minus) Annual Changes in NIP, 1990-2000 






















































Figure 2. Net Flows - Transactions and Valuation Effects, 1990-2000  























































Valuation Effects  51
Figure 3. Gross Assets and Liabilities - Total Flows, 1990-2000  

























































Figure 4. Gross Assets and Liabilities - Valuation Effects, 1990-2000  
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Figure 5. Gross Assets and Liabilities, with and without Int. Reserves - Transactions, 
1990-2000  
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Figure 6. Types of Flows in Selected NIP Components in 1998-1999 




Valuation effects of Liabilities  










Private Transaction Flows 












Private Transaction Flows 














Change in Total Assets abroad by Private 
Sector 12 months ending 1998.4 
Banks, 817.9, 




4219.2, 64%  54
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Figure 11. Monetary Policy and Interbank Overnight Interest Rate in 1998  












Figure 12. Actual and Exchange Rate Target Band, 1997-1999 
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Figure 13. Change in International Reserves, Dec. 1997 - Dec. 1998  





















































Figure 14. Effect of One-year 100bp Monetary Policy Interest Rate Shock on 
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Figure 16. Expected and Actual GDP Growth  









1998Q1 1998Q2 1998Q3 1998Q4 1999Q1 1999Q2 1999Q3 1999Q4
1999 CB and MoF Forecast 1999 Consensus
Actual Base 1986 Actual Base 1996
 
 
   59
 
Figure 17. Non-Performing Loans, 1997-2000 


































Figure 18. Actual, Private Sector Forecast and Target Inflation, 1997-1998 
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Figure 19. Unit Price of Exports in US Dollars in Real Time, 1997Q2-1999Q2 
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Figure 20. Unit Price of Imports in US Dollars in Real Time, 1997Q2-1999Q2 
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Figure 21. Current Account Deficit in Real Time  
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Figure 22. Sudden Stop Intensity Distribution – Alternative Scales 
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Figure 23. Chile 1998 Sudden Stop Performance Indicators in Perspective 
 


























































































































































































-40% -35% -30% -25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0%
 